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Abstract. In many CCTV and sensor network based intelligent surveil-
lance systems, a number of attributes or criteria are used to individually
evaluate the degree of potential threat of a suspect. The outcomes for
these attributes are in general from analytical algorithms where data are
often pervaded with uncertainty and incompleteness. As a result, such
individual threat evaluations are often inconsistent, and individual eval-
uations can change as time elapses. Therefore, integrating heterogeneous
threat evaluations with temporal influence to obtain a better overall
evaluation is a challenging issue. So far, this issue has rarely be consid-
ered by existing event reasoning frameworks under uncertainty in sensor
network based surveillance. In this paper, we first propose a weighted
aggregation operator based on a set of principles that constraints the
fusion of individual threat evaluations. Then, we propose a method to
integrate the temporal influence on threat evaluation changes. Finally, we
demonstrate the usefulness of our system with a decision support event
modeling framework using an airport security surveillance scenario.
1 Introduction
CCTV and sensor network-based intelligent surveillance systems are increasing-
ly critical for public security and infrastructure protection due to the growing
threat of terrorist attack, anti-social and criminal behaviors. Since events in
surveillance systems are detected from different intelligent sensor technologies
including audio, video and infrared, RFID, logs, or other sensory devices, how
to combine events detected from multiple sources relating to the same suspect
(hereafter, we refer it as subject ) to obtain an overall estimation of its potential
threat is a challenging problem. For example, a scenario can be of that from a
camera in a security domain a male is detected (with a higher degree of threat)
while from the personnel authentication identification system it indicates the
person is a new member of staff (with a lower degree of threat). A straightfor-
ward method to handle this problem is to apply a number of independent criteria
(e.g., gender, age, ID, behavior) to individually assess the potential threat of a
subject, and then to combine these individual evaluations to produce an over-
all assessment. Since these individual evaluations cannot always be in complete
agreement and the priorities of these criteria are different, adequate fusion oper-
ators (e.g., weighted aggregation operators) are necessary to obtain the overall
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estimation of potential threat for each subject and resolve the inconsistent or
conflicting information.
At the same time, there may be multiple subjects with potential threats
occurring simultaneously. Either due to the limited security resources, or due
to the degree of potential threat is not significant enough to trigger an action,
sometimes a security force will not take actions to prevent a potential threat im-
mediately. In this case, the temporal influence on the threat degree, i.e., how the
threat degree changes with time without external intervention, or how the threat
degree changes with time when new evidence is collected, are both important to
consider in an intelligence surveillance system.
In the literature, although there have been several event modeling and rea-
soning systems proposed [2, 3, 5, 6, 8], however, none of the models has properly
addressed these two issues (detailed discussions will be in the related work sec-
tion). In order to address these problems, in this paper, we first analyze general
principles that should be obeyed by a fusion process that combines individu-
al threat evaluations. Then, we introduce a weighted aggregation operator to
obtain the overall degree of potential threat for each subject after considering
all related criteria, from which we can set the priority for each subject. After
that, we propose a method to revise the potential threat degree based on elaping
time to take into account the temporal influence of that criteria of each subjec-
t. Finally, we will illustrate our method with an airport security surveillance
scenario.
This paper advances the state of the art on information fusion for decision
support for intelligent surveillance systems in the following aspects. (i) We ana-
lyze general principles for an appropriate aggregation operator in the surveillance
system. It gives a cornerstone to build up a generic axiomatic framework for the
integration of heterogeneous threat evaluation. (ii) We introduce a weighted ag-
gregation operator to combine the degrees of potential threats of each criterion
and give an overall estimation to each subject. (iii) We propose a method to deal
with two types of temporal influence for the potential threats.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps some basic
concepts in Dempster-Shafer theory. Section 3 discusses some principles govern
threat evaluation fusion processes. Section 4 introduces an aggregation operator
that obeys the principles to fuse degrees of potential threats. Sections 5 provides
a case study to illustrate the usefulness of our model. Finally, Section 6 discusses
the related work and concludes the paper with future work.
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1 [10] Let Θ be a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive elements,
called a frame of discernment (or simple a frame). Function m : 2Θ→ [0, 1] is a
mass function if m(∅) =0 and ∑A⊆Θm(A)=1. And a function Pl : 2Θ → [0, 1],
defined as follows, is called a plausibility function over Θ:
Pl(A) =
∑
B∩A 6=φ
m(B). (1)
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One advantage of D-S theory is that it provides a method to accumulate and
combine evidence from multiple sources by using Dempster combination rule.
Definition 2 (Dempster combination rule) Let m1 and m2 be two mass
functions over a frame of discernment Θ. Then Dempster combination function
m12 = m1
⊕
m2 is given by:
m12(X) =

0 if X = ∅∑
A
⋂
B=X
m1(A)m2(B)
1− ∑
A
⋂
B=∅
m1(A)m2(B)
if X 6= ∅ (2)
When a new piece of evidence, which is collected after fusion, Jeffrey-Dempster
revision rule [7] can be applied to update the current evidence. This rule is useful
for considering the temporal influence for the DPTC (Degree of Potential Threat
for a subject w.r.t a given Criterion ).
Definition 3 (Jeffrey-Dempster revision rule) Let m and mI be two mass
functions over a frame of discernment Θ. The Jeffrey-Dempster revision function
of m by mI , denoted as m ◦JD mI , is defined by:
(m ◦JD mI)(C) =
∑
A∩B=C
σm(A, B)mI(B), for any C 6= ∅, (3)
where σm(A, B) =

m(A)
Pl(B) for Pl(B) > 0,
0 for Pl(B) = 0 and A 6= B,
1 for Pl(B) = 0 and A = B.
3 Principles of Threat Evaluation Aggregation
In order to hold commonalities for the aggregation process in different specif-
ic surveillance situations and develop adequate weighted aggregation operators
for specific applications, in this section, we propose some basic principles for
threat evaluation aggregation. These principles aim for revealing commonalities
for general aggregation processes, that specific, appropriate weighted aggregation
operators should satisfy.
(i) Conclusion Modification: Consider one more threat evaluation for a
given subject w.r.t a new criterion can modify the current evaluation to
either increase, decrease, or unchange.
(ii) Evaluation Consistency: The overall potential threat evaluation for a
given subject should increase when the point valued degree of potential
threat for such subject w.r.t each related criterion increase.
(iii) Evaluation commensurability: A system shall provide an overall eval-
uation for each subject after the aggregation process, and the overall eval-
uations for different subjects are comparable (on a commensurable scale).
(iv) Irrelevance of evidence ordering: The result of an aggregation should
not be affected by the ordering of aggregation.
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(v) Importance Dependency: The effect of the DPTC for the overall e-
valuation is dependent on the importance (reflected as a weight) of this
criterion.
The first principle translates the DPTC into three types of influence for
the overall evaluation. (i) Positive evidence: the degree of threat will increase
after considering a DPTC. For example, the fact that a person holding a knife
will enhance our belief that this person is dangerous. (ii) Negative evidence:
the degree of threat will decrease after considering a DPTC. For instance, age-
information with an age value as old will weaken our belief that this person is
dangerous. And (iii) neutral evidence, the degree of threat is not affected after
considering a DPTC. for example, the evidence that a person has been waiting
for friends has no influence on our beliefs about his degree of threat.
The second principle captures the monotonicity of the aggregation operation:
the higher value a DPTC will be, the higher value the overall degree of threat for
the subject is, ceteris paribus. Also, the second principle guarantees the property
of strict transitivity for the ranking order about potential threat for the subjects
in a surveillance environment. That is, suppose a  b means subject a is more
dangerous than subject b, if for subjects a, b, c, we have a  b and b  c, then
a  c. The violation of the strict transitivity axiom implies that an intelligence
surveillance system will be unable to determine the most dangerous subject.
The third principle means that a surveillance system can give a complete
ranking order for subjects in a given situation based on their overall potential
threat evaluations. Hence, the requirement of overall commensurability among
the subjects of different situations suggests that all the outcomes of overall eval-
uations need to be in a unified bounded range.
The forth principle guarantees that the overall potential threat evaluation
shall not be influenced by the order of fusing the individual DPTCs. Thus, it
reveals two properties in the surveillance system (let R(xi, xj) be the aggre-
gation of evaluations about xi and xj .). (i) Associativity: R(R(x1, x2), x3) =
R(x1, R(x2, x3)). (ii) Symmetry: R(x1, x2) = R(x2, x1)
The fifth principle reveals the essential meaning of weights: (i) when a DPTC
increases, the weighted DPTC should also increase; (ii) after considering the ef-
fect of weight in our aggregation operator, the first principle to the forth principle
should be remained.
4 A Weighted Aggregation Operator
The basic principles for the weighted aggregation operator in surveillance system-
s, proposed in the previous section, is a set of constraints of information fusion
frameworks. It can be instantiated in different ways. We discuss one weighted ag-
gregation operator in this section that satisfies these principles (below, without
losing general, we assume the individual DPTC is a point-value in [0,1]).
Since a DPTC is a point value in a range, the distinction of three types of
evidence (positive, neutral, negative) to some extent suggests the setting of an
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expectation threshold for the degrees of potential threats w.r.t each criterion.
Thus, when a DPTC exceeds the threshold, it is positive evidence; when equals
to the threshold, neutral evidence; and when below the threshold, negative ev-
idence. Table 1 summarizes a list of terms (and notations) used in a weighted
aggregation operator.
Table 1. The terms in weighted aggregation operators
Terms Interpretation
νi(x) DPTC of subject x for criterion i
wi the weight for criterion wi
g(wi, νi(x)) weighted DPTC
R(g(wi, νi(x)), g(wj , νj(x))) aggregated assessment of g(wi, νi(x)) and g(wj , νj(x))
e ∈ (0, 1) the threshold to distinguish different types of evidence
Now, we can introduce a weighted aggregation operator for the overall degree
of potential threat for any two criteria 1 and 2 as follow:
R(g(w1, ν1(x)), g(w2, ν2(x)))
=
(1−e)g(w1, ν1(x))g(w2, ν2(x))
(1−e)g(w1, ν1(x))g(w2, ν2(x))+e(1−g(w1, ν1(x)))(1−g(w2, ν2(x))) , (4)
where
g(wi, νi(x)) = wiνi(x) + (1− wi)e. (5)
Here, e is the threshold value to distinguish different types of evidence. More-
over, in Equation (5), we combine a uninorm aggregation operator R(x, y) =
(1−e)xy
(1−e)xy+e(1−x)(1−y) as shown in [4] with a weighting function g(wi, νi(x)) =
wiνi(x) + (1−wi)e in [11]. Finally, with the proof in [11], the weighting function
g(wi, νi(x)) = wiνi(x) + (1− wi)e satisfies the following four conditions:
– Monotonicity in value: if νi(x) > νi(y), then g(wi, νi(x)) > g(wi, νi(y)). It
means that as the degree of potential threat with respect to a given criterion
i for subject x increases, the weighted value should also increase.
– Normality of importance of one: g(1, νi(x)) = νi(x). Thus, when the weight
is set to 1, the weighted value does not change.
– No effect for zero importance elements: g(0, νi(x)) = e, where e is a threshold
in our operator R(ν1(x), ν2(x)).
– Consistency of effect on wi: for a ≥ b, g(a, νi(x)) ≥ g(b, νi(x)) if νi(x) ≥ e;
for a ≥ b, g(a, νi(x)) ≤ g(b, νi(x)) if νi(x) ≤ e. Here consistency means
that after considering the effect of weight in our aggregation operator, the
property of the uninorm aggregation operator as shown in the following
Equations (6)-(8) will be remained.
The aggregation operator introduced is a weighted uninorm aggregation op-
erator [11] that satisfies: (i) Monotonicity: x1 ≥ y1 ∧ x2 ≥ y2 ⇒ R(x1, x2) ≥
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R(y1, y2). (ii) Boundary conditions: R(0, 0) = 0; R(1, 1) = 1. (iii) Associativity:
R(R(x1, x2), x3) = R(x1, R(x2, x3)). (iv) Symmetry: R(x1, x2) = R(x2, x1). (v)
Neutral element: ∃e ∈ (0, 1), ∀x ∈ [0, 1], R(e, x) = x.
Finally, we introduce the preference ordering to rank the potential threat of
subjects according to their overall evaluations with the following definition.
Definition 4 For two subjects x and y, the strict preference ordering  is de-
fined as follows:
x  y ⇔ R(g(wi, νi(x)), . . . , g(wn, νn(x))) > R(g(wj , νj(y)), . . . , g(wm, νm(y)))
This ordering states that the potential threat of x is higher than that of y, if
the overall evaluation of x is greater than that of y. Thus, with the equivalence
relation ∼ (i.e., x ∼ y if x 6 y and y 6 x), we can compare any two subjects as
shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For a set of subjects X, the strict preference ordering  in Defini-
tion 4 satisfies:
– Completeness For any subjects x and y in X, we have x  y or x ≺ y or
x ∼ y.
– Strict Transitivity For any subjects x, y and z in X, if x  y and y  z,
then x  z.
Proof. (i) By Definition 4, we have
x  y ⇔ R(g(wi, νi(x)), . . . , g(wn, νn(x))) > R(g(wj , νj(y)), . . . , g(wm, νm(y))),
which means that y 6 x. That is, the preference order  satisfies asymmetry: if
x is strictly preferred to y, then y is not strictly preferred to x. Also x ∼ y iff
x 6 y and y 6 x. As a result, the preference order  satisfies the completeness
that follows from the definition of ∼ and the fact that  is asymmetric. So,
property (i) holds.
(ii) Suppose x  y and y  z. By Definition 4, x  y and y  z imply
that R(g(wi, νi(x)), . . . , g(wn, νn(x))) > R(g(wj , νj(y)), . . . , g(wm, νm(y))) and
R(g(wj , νj(y)), . . . , g(wm, νm(y))) > R(g (wk, νk(z)), . . . , g(wo, νo(z))), respec-
tively. As a result, R(g(wi, νi(x)), . . . , g(wn, νn(x))) > R(g(wk, νk(z)), . . . , g(wo,
νo(z))). Thus x  z. So, propertyp (ii) holds. 
Now, we show that such a weighted aggregation operator satisfies the prin-
ciples that we proposed in the previous section.
For the first principle about Conclusion Modification, it is equivalent to prove
that our operator satisfies the following Theorem:
Theorem 2 Let νc(x) be the point valued degree of potential threat for subject
x with respect to criterion c, wc be the weight of criterion c, e ∈ (0, 1) be the
threshold to distinguish different types of evidence, D(x) be the degree of over-
all potential threat for all related criteria except criterion c for subject x, and
R(A,B) be the combined assessment of degrees of two potential threat A and B.
Then we have
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(i) Effect of positive evidence: if νc(x) > e, then R(D(x), g(wc, νc(x)) ≥ D(x).
(ii) Effect of negative evidence: if νc(x) < e, then R(D(x), g(wc, νc(x)) ≤ D(x).
(iii) Effect of neutral evidence: if νc(x) = e, then R(D(x), g(wc, νc(x)) = D(x).
Proof. By Equation (5), we have
g(wc, νc(x))− e = wcνc(x) + (1− wc)e− e = wc(νc(x)− e)
Thus, if νc(x) > e, g(wc, νc(x)) > e and if νc(x) < e, g(wc, νc(x)) < e. So, since
D(x) = R(D(x), e), by Monotonicity, items (i) and (ii) holds. Moreover, by the
property of Neutral element for our aggregation operator, we have R(D(x), e) =
D(x). Then item (iii) holds. 
For the second principle of Evaluation Consistency, the monotonicity of the
aggregation operator is proved in [11] and the strict transitivity for the ranking
order is shown by the second item of Theorem 1.
For the third principle of Evaluation Commensurability, the completeness of
the ranking order over potential threats for the subjects is shown by the first
item of Theorem 1. With monotonicity, the property of boundary conditions says
that the aggregated assessment value is in the interval [0, 1]. Thus, our operator
gives a unified range for the value of overall evaluation as well.
For the forth principle of Irrelevance of Evidence Ordering, the properties of
associativity and commutativity together show that we can combine the weighted
DPTCs in any order. Thus, our operator satisfies the forth principle.
For the fifth principle, it is guaranteed by the four conditions about the
weighting function g(wi, νi(x)) = wiνi(x) + (1− wi)e in our operator.
Finally, our aggregation operator also satisfies the properties in [11] that:
∀x, y ∈ (e, 1), R(x, y) ≥ max{x, y} (6)
∀x, y ∈ (0, e), R(x, y) ≤ min{x, y} (7)
∀x ∈ (0, e), y ∈ (e, 1), x ≤ R(x, y) ≤ y (8)
These three equations (Equations (6)-(8)) not only point out the different
aggregation results of our operator, but also reveal a desirable property in our
operator: if all the degrees of potential threats exceed a threshold, the opera-
tor should produce a higher degree of threat, hence, the corresponding subject
is of higher priority to deal with. If all of the degrees are below a threshold,
the operator produces a lower level degree of threat and hence no immediate
actions taken. For example, suppose a young man holds a knife and intrudes
into a secured area. All criteria: age, gender, intentions show that the person
is dangerous, then the surveillance system (after aggregating all the evidence)
should produce a strong alert indicator for taking actions. On the other hand,
in the case that an old lady holds a walking stick and passes the security door,
since all criteria show that the person is harmless, the surveillance system will
not raise any alert unless other strong evidence has emerged showing that the
woman is dangerous. In terms of fusion, it has an reinforcement effect: when all
the evidence are strongly suggesting a subject is dangerous, the overall degree
of threat of the subject is increased above any individual degrees.
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5 Temporal Influence for Point Valued Potential Threats
Now, we consider the temporal influence issue in surveillance systems. Generally
speaking, a temporal influence of a given criterion on the assessment of the
degree of threat of a subject can be divided into two categories: the temporal
influence without external intervention and the temporal influence with new
evidence observed.
To investigate the first category of temporal influence, let us consider the
following scenario. A person is loitering near the ticket counter at 9:10 pm.
The security team for the area cannot take any action due to limited security
resources. Twenty minutes later, one security team returned. Now, the security
manager should pay more attention to this person since it is unusual for a person
to loiter near the ticket counter for such a long time, even without any new
evidence about the subject w.r.t this criterion.
Intuitively, there should be three types of temporal influences without exter-
nal intervention for the point valued degree of potential threat with respect to
different criteria: increase, neutral, and decrease. For example, for age or gender,
their threat degrees will not change with time; for leaving objects (e.g., a bag)
alone, the threat degree should change over time; but for some emotions, such
as anger, their threat degrees should decrease with time (a person will fight with
others when he is very angry. However, after a while, his potential threat for
engaging into a fight will decrease). Based on this intuition, we can obtain the
following equation.
vc(x) = νc(x)
γb
t−t0
n
c
(9)
where γ < 1 increasing DPTC with time change;γ = 1 neutral DPTC with time change;
γ > 1 decreasing DPTC with time change.
(10)
Here, νc(x) is the point valued degree of potential threat for subject x w.r.t.
criterion c that is calculated at point of time to (here to is the latest time-point
for the occT s of all related events to generate νc(x)), t is the current time-point, n
(n > 0) is the time interval between two key time points for updating, and γ (γ ∈
(0,+∞)) is the influence rate. Moreover, in real-life applications, surveillance
systems will update evidence regularly, we introduce the time interval n, and
b t−t0n c means that we will take integers downwards in function t−t0n . Hence,
in real-life applications, always the change of the DPTC is limited: a positive
evidence will never turn out to be a negative evidence no matter how much
time elapse. For example, for the emotion of anger, it will be positive evidence
that will increase the potential threat, even after a moment of calming down,
it will not become negative evidence, which will decrease the potential threat
of a given subject. Similarly, most negative evidence will not become positive
evidence, even though it might be natural. However, some negative evidence
may become positive evidence, such as a member of staff staying overly long
in a security field. Based on Equation (9), it is possible to obtain the following
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definition for the degree of potential threats updated by temporal influences
without external intervention.
Definition 5 Consider the condition that the temporal influences without ex-
ternal intervention, let νc(x) be the degree of potential threat with respect to
criterion c for subject x generated at point of time to (here to is the latest time
point for the occT s of all related events to generate νc(x)), t be the current time,
n (n > 0) be the time interval between two key time points for updating, γ be
the degree of influence rate that γ ∈ (0,+∞), and e ∈ (0, 1) be the threshold to
distinguish different types of evidence, then the degrees of potential threats w.r.t.
criterion c for subject x for temporal influence, denote as ac(x) is
ac(x) = h
−1(νc(x)γ
b t−t0
n
c
) (11)
where
h(x) = 1ex if γ < 1, negative evidence will not become positive,
and νc(x) < e;
h(x) = 11−e (x− e) if γ > 1, positive evidence will not become negative,
and νc(x) > e ;
h(x) = x otherwise.
(12)
The first condition means that the updated degree of potential threat will not
be greater than the threshold e when evidence is negative, i.e., ac(x) ∈ [0, e] when
νc(x) < e. Hence, if γ ≥ 1, it is clear that ac(x) ∈ [0, e] if νc(x) < e. Similarly,
the updated degree of potential threat will not be less than the threshold e when
νc(x) > e, i.e., ac(x) ∈ [e, 1] when νc(x) > e. This is the exact meaning of the
function h(x).
Moreover, when γ 6= 1, the value of γ is determined by the real-time duration
of observing a given criterion or the termination of observing the criterion. For
example, consider the criterion of person leaving an item, after detecting a person
abandoning an items, it can be set as that 15-minutes is the maximum time
duration for taking a further action. Suppose the time interval between two key
time points for updating evidence is 1 minute, the significant figure is 0.001, and
the potential threat higher than 0.9 means a very dangerous situation that the
security team has to take further action, then for any νPL(x) > e, we should have
νPL(x)
γ15 ≥ 0.9 by Definition 5. Hence, we can obtain that γ = 15√loge+0.001 0.9.
Similarly, consider the criterion of emotion, after detecting the person is angry,
10-minutes can be the maximum time period for angry emotion to disappear.
As a result, suppose the time interval between two key time points for updating
evidence is 1 minute, the significant figure is 0.001, and the potential threat lower
than e+0.01 means the effect can be ignored, consider that such positive evidence
will not become a negative one, by Definition 5, we have (1− e)(νc(x)γ10) + e =
e+ 0.01. Then, we have γ = 10
√
log0.999
0.01
1−e .
Now, we consider the second category of time influence: the temporal influ-
ence with new evidence occurs. For example, in the case of a person loitering
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near the ticket counter at 9:10 p.m., if there is new information in 9:10 p.m. to
9:30 p.m., which points out that the person had met a friend and left in the
passed 20 minutes. Then, in this case, we should consider the effect of new evi-
dence for the threat degree of this person. In fact, since the effect of new event
is to update the belief for the possible outcomes related to a given criterion for
a given subject. Hence, since the new evidence reveals the more recent situation
for the subject, i.e., the new evidence is more reliable than the pervious one, it
should be retained whilst the prior belief of the system should be changed.
As a result, first, we will use the Dempster combination rule (Equation (2))
to obtain the overall mass function for all new evidence of a given criterion.
Then, we apply the Jeffrey-Dempster revision rule (Equation (3)) to update the
mass function for the possible outcome of a given criterion. After considering all
evidence that are related to the belief about the possible outcomes w.r.t a given
criterion, we can apply the model in [8] to obtain the degree of potential threat
with time influence in this condition directly. Finally, our weighted aggregation
operator can be applied to obtain the overall degree of a potential threat for
each subject.
6 Case Study
Let us consider a scenario in an airport, which covers the following two areas:
Shopping Area (SA) and Control Center (CC).
– in the Shopping Area (SA), a person (id: 13) loiters near a Foreign Currency
Exchange office (FCE) for a long time. Also, camera 42 catches its back image
at the entrance of the shopping area at 9:01 pm and camera 45 catches its
side face image at FCE from 9:03 pm to 9:15 pm;
– In airport terminal 1 a person (id: 21) leaved a bag and disappeared. That
is, camera 49 captures its side face and that it brings a bag at 9:01 pm,
camera 44 captures its back at 9:02 pm and camera 43 captures the bag on
the ground without a person around from 9:03 pm to 9:15 pm.
Now, suppose the only one security team was at another area to prevent
threat and returned at 9:30 pm. And during this time period, camera 45 captured
the person (id:13) leaving the shopping area and walking towards east. Suppose
there are no other emergency happening during this time interval, then what
will the surveillance system suggest to do?
As the security team does not eliminate these two potential threats (id:13 and
id:21) immediately, the surveillance system has to consider the new evidence and
the temporal influence for the point valued degrees of potential threats for each
criterion of these two subject at 9:30 pm. Moreover, with the event modeling in
[8], for the person (id: 13) in FCEC, we have a piece of new evidence about the
movement criterion: em5 =(FCEC, 9:03-9:15 p.m, 45, 0.9, 0.6, movement, 0.8, 13,
FCEC, mm2 ({toward east}) = 1). Thus, by the degree of reliability of sensor 42,
mm3 ({walk east})=0.9, mm3 ({walk east, . . . , run east, . . . , stay, loiter})=0.1.
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Hence, considering the temporal influence with new evidence occurs by Jeffrey-
Dempster revision rule (Equation (3)), we havemm123({walk east})=0.9,mm123({walk
east, loiter})=0.0137,mm123({loiter})=0.081,mm123({walk east, . . . , run east, . . . ,
stay, loiter}) = 0.0053. As a result, since the mass value mm123({loiter}) = 0.081
and we suppose the condition of the only one inference rule about the movement
is defined as mmi ({loiter}) > 0.5 ∧ e.location = FCEC ∧ tn − t0 > 10 min, we
will omit the criterion of movement for the reason that we cannot confirm the
intention of the subject based on the already known evidence about behaviors.
Now, we consider the time influence for the criteria without external inter-
vention for two potential threats (id:13 and id:21) by Definition 5. Clearly, the
degrees of potential threats for the criteria of age and gender should not change
with time (γ = 1) and the degrees of potential threats for the criteria of PL
(Intention of Person loitering) and PLI (Intention of Person Leaving an Item)
should increase with time. Moreover, for the criterion of PL, since there exists
new evidence about it, we do not need to consider the temporal influence for the
degree of potential threat with respect to the criterion of PL. Now, suppose the
degree of influence rate for the criteria of PLI is (γ = 0.8). Then, by Definition
5 and νa(21) > e (e = 0.5), we have aa(13) = νa(13) = 0.56, ag(13) = 0.547;
aa(21) = 0.565, ag(21) = 0.582, aPLI(21) = (0.672)
0.8b
9:30−9:15
1
c
= 0.986.
Moreover, by the weighted aggregation operator, we have
R(g(0.3, νa(13)), g(0.3, νg(13))) = 0.518 ∗ 0.514 = 0.532
R(g(0.3, νa(21)), g(0.3, νg(21)), g(0.8, νIPLI(21))) = 0.906
Finally, by Definition 4, we have id 21  id 13. So the surveillance system
will suggest the security team to intervene id 21. That is, to find out what is
contained in the abandoned bag and arrest the person (id:21) if it is necessary.
7 Related Work and Summary
In the literature, there are plenty of event modeling and reasoning systems, such
as Finite State Machines [3], Bayesian Networks [2], and event composition with
imperfect information [5, 6], event modeling with decision support[8], etc. In
general, these systems consider two branches to address the integration of het-
erogeneous information: most of them consider all information in a scenario as a
whole, and with rules or fusion algorithms for each specific scenario. So, if we add
a new criterion into a scenario, all of these systems must modify the knowledge
base and other related aspects with the new criterion. Therefore, these system-
s are somehow not flexible and effective for dynamic surveillance environment
with a huge volume of surveillance data from different sensors. Another line of
research [8] applies aggregation process we suggested in this paper. However, the
operator proposed in [8] does not satisfy all the basic principles for an adequate
aggregation operator. Moreover, the aggregation process in surveillance systems
have also been discussed in the literature. Albusac et al. in [1] analyzed different
aggregation operators and proposed a new aggregation method based on the
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Sugeno integral for multiple criteria in the domain of intelligent surveillance.
Also, Rudas et al. in [9] offered a comprehensive study of information aggre-
gation in intelligence systems from different application fields such as robotics,
vision, knowledge based systems and data mining, etc. However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no research suggesting a set of basic principles to define
an adequate operator for the aggregation process or considering the temporal
influence in surveillance systems.
In this paper, we introduced the basic principles to handle the integration of
heterogeneous threat evaluation in surveillance systems and proposed a weighted
aggregation operator to instantiate such principle. We also discussed the tem-
poral influence in the aggregation process. Our next step of work is to build up
a general axiom framework for the aggregation process and test such framework
with surveillance data.
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